As we know, the Fifteenth World Congress of Philosophy has as its general theme problems of science, technology, and man. Any aspect of this all-encompassing theme produces many questions. Our task is to single out certain important aspects in it.

Contributions de: Préface de Sava Ganovski - Alfred Cyril Ewing, My philosophical Attitude/Mon attitude philosophique - Marvin Farber, On the Philosopher's Individual Testimony as the Authentic Form of Thought/Connaissance de la pensée par le témoignage personnel - Kurt Huebner, Von der Geschichtlichkeit der empirischen Wissenschaften/ L'historicité des sciences empiriques - Richard McKeon, The Circumstances and Functions of Philosophy/Les conditions d'exercice et les fonctions de la philosophie - John Passmore, The Making of an Australian Philosopher/La réalisation d'un philosophe australien (...) - Chaim Perelman, Philosophie, rhétorique, lieux communs/Philosophy, Rhetoric, Common Places - Ioannis N. Theodoracopoulos, La philosophie comme témoignage de l'expérience intérieure/Die Philosophie als Zeugnis der inneren Erfahrung. (shrink)

Foundations of Speech Act Theoryoffers a timely, thorough and, above all, compelling examination of the complexities of illocutionary acts, performatives, and their phenomenological basis. Savas Tsohatzidis has collected an impressive range of international scholars on the subject. Clearly demonstrating the relevance of speech act theory to semantic theory, the collection further interrogates the inability of pragmatic theories of illocution to properly locate such speech acts within the logic of phenomenology and intersubjectivity.

A problem is raised for the introduction rules proposed in Benjamin Schnieder’s ‘A logic for “because”’, arising in connection with (a) inferences that the rules should not, but do, validate and (b) inferences that the rules should, but do not, validate.

This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.

The aim of this study is to investigate students’ conceptions about proof in mathematics and mathematics teaching. A five‐point Likert‐type questionnaire was administered in order to gather data. The sample of the study included 33 first‐year secondary school mathematics students . The data collected were analysed and interpreted using the methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis. The results have revealed that the students think that mathematical proof has an important place in mathematics and mathematics education. The students’ studying methods for (...) exams based on imitative reasoning which can be described as a type of reasoning built on copying proof, for example, by looking at a textbook or course notes proof or through remembering a proof algorithm. Moreover, they addressed to the differences between mathematics taught in high school and university as the main cause of their difficulties in proof and proving. (shrink)

This collection should be welcomed by anyone working on the subtle interplay between theories of perception, internalism and externalism about mental and linguistic content, and the linguistic expression of mental states. Many of these connections have been put into focus by John Searle, and his views are here subjected to careful scrutiny from a variety of directions. The contributions do not sum to a general discussion of Searle's contributions to the philosophy of mind and language. There is little or nothing (...) here on, for example, the Chinese rooms and Strong AI, or on his more recent work on social construction and rationality. Such absences are an inevitable consequence of the sheer number of influential theses Searle has advanced over the decades. Instead, the locus of discussion is the systematic perspective most clearly set out in his work, a fact that lends integrity to the volume.The book is divided into two main parts, with inevitable links across the divide. The first is concerned with the intentionality of mental states, and the second with the intentionality of linguistic acts. The first kind of intentionality is, according to Searle, intrinsic, while the second is inherited from the first, with linguistic conventions affording the derivation. The two kinds of intentionality parallel one another …. (shrink)

We consider a new fragment of first-order logic with two variables. This logic is defined over interval structures. It constitutes unary predicates, a binary predicate and a function symbol. Considering such a fragment of first-order logic is motivated by defining a general framework for event-based interval temporal logics. In this paper, we present a sound, complete and terminating decision procedure for this logic. We show that the logic is decidable, and provide a NEXPTIME complexity bound for satisfiability. This result shows (...) that even a simple decidable fragment of first-order logic has NEXPTIME complexity. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has argued that, unless the speech act of assertion were supposed to be governed by his so-called Knowledge Rule, one could not explain why sentences of the form "A and I do not know that A" are unassertable. This paper advances three objections against that argument, of which the first two aim to show that, even assuming that Williamson's explanandum has been properly circumscribed, his explanation would not be correct, and the third aims to show that his explanandum (...) has not been properly circumscribed. (shrink)

This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he (...) recommends nor with one of his key assumptions regarding the inadequacy of a kind of semantic theory he rejects. (shrink)

Several influential philosophical accounts of assertion have recently been claimed by Peter Pagin to commit a fundamental mistake. The present paper argues that Pagin's defence of that claim is flawed: The criterion he proposes for evaluating theories of assertion is unreliable; and even if it were supposed to be in itself reliable, it could not be used, in the way he proposes, either against the kinds of theories he intends to undermine or in favour of the kind of theory he (...) intends to support. (shrink)

The most distinctive, and probably the most striking, assumption of Donald Davidson's well known ‘paratactic’ analysis of the logical form of saying ascriptions is that the “that”-clause that, in such an ascription, specifies the content of the ascribed act of saying, is neither syntactically nor semantically part of the sentence effecting the ascription. The present paper identifies a neglected problem that this assumption engenders for the Davidsonian analysis. The problem arises in connection with instances of saying ascriptions that are both (...) self-verifying and self-referential, and consists in the fact that, given the Davidsonian assumption, these ascriptions must be assigned logical forms that misrepresent their logically relevant properties. (shrink)

In this volume, Savas L. Tsohatzidis brings together a team of leading experts to provide up-to-date perspectives on the work of J. L. Austin, a major figure in twentieth-century philosophy and an important contributor to theories of language, truth, perception, and knowledge. Focusing on aspects of Austin's writings in these four areas, the volume's ten original essays critically examine central elements of his philosophy, exploring their interrelationships, their historical context, their reception, and their implications for key issues of contemporary philosophical (...) research. The volume deepens our understanding of Austin's philosophy while illustrating its continuing significance, and will appeal to students and scholars of modern philosophy, particularly to those interested in the philosophy of language and epistemology. (shrink)

This paper is an addendum to [Tsohatzidis, 2013].

This paper intends to contribute to the evaluation of the project of analyzing speech act concepts in terms of mental state concepts, by examining Searle's and Vanderveken's proposed analyses of certain types of illocutionary acts as expressions of corresponding types of emotional states. It is argued that the proposed analyses are all defective, that the assumptions about underlying speech act/mental state parallelisms from which their initial plausibility might be taken to derive are themselves mistaken, and that the fact that they (...) have been proposed at all betrays insufficient attention to the distinction between semanti-cally and pragmatically determined aspects of utterance interpretation. It is concluded that these results disturb both the overall structure of Searle's and Vanderveken's theory of speech acts, and the logic of several other similarly reductionist claims in the philosophy of language. (shrink)